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i1 Introduction
This paper studies the auctioneer’s incentives to provide information to bidders in
private value settings and, more importantly, the relationship between the provision
of information and the level of competition in the market measured by the number of
bidders participating in the auction. We show that it is not optimal for the auctioneer
to provide the eﬃcient level of information, that both the optimal and the eﬃcient
level of information precision increase with the number of participants in the auction,
and both converge when the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity.
There are many situations in which the auctioneer can to some extent aﬀect bidders’
information. Take Internet auctions for example. In most of these auctions sellers have
most of the information about the goods on sale and they decide how much information
to reveal to bidders by posting electronic images, providing text descriptions, etc.
Similarly, governments soliciting bids to execute a public project or a company selling
a subsidiary have a lot of information on the goods at auction and control how and
how much will reach bidders.
The question of whether an auctioneer with information that is useful to bidders
should keep it hidden or disclose it has a very powerful answer, the so called “linkage
principle” derived by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in an aﬃliated values environment.
According to the linkage principle the expected-revenue-maximizing policy for the
auctioneer is to commit to fully and publicly announce all information he has. Thus,
the level of information provided to the market is the eﬃcient one and is independent
of competition.
As we will demonstrate below, this result does not hold in private value auctions.
The reason is that the eﬀect of disclosing information to bidders prior to the auction
is fundamentally diﬀerent in common value versus private value settings. In common
1value environments, bidders’ preferences are aligned and bidders react symmetrically
to the information revealed by the auctioneer and the revelation of information does
not generate bidder rents. In private value environments bidders have heterogenous
preferences, and their valuations depend on the match between their preferences and
the characteristics of the object. This means that any information revealed by the
auctioneer will be perceived diﬀerently by diﬀerent bidders, raising the valuation of
some bidders while reducing that of others. This asymmetric reaction to information
may result in bidders’ informational rents1.
We show that, when facing the decision of how much information to reveal in a
private value setting, the auctioneer faces two opposing forces: more information im-
proves the eﬃciency of the match while it also increases informational rents. As the
auctioneer balances improved eﬃciency (which raises revenues) with increased infor-
mational rents (which reduce them), the auctioneer will reveal an ineﬃcient amount
of information.
Further, we are interested in the relationship between the level of information
in the market and competition. We prove that total surplus and the auctioneer’s ex-
pected revenue are supermodular in the number of bidders and the level of information
precision. This implies that the eﬃcient and the auctioneer’s optimal amount of infor-
mation provision are increasing in the level of competition measured in terms of the
number of bidders in the auction. In our setting, total surplus depends on the match
between the object and the winning bidder’s preferences, and the cost of information.
If you add an extra bidder, this increases the opportunity of a better match and the
marginal value of information, since this bidder reaps some eﬃciency gains from more
1As mentioned earlier, when talking about information we have in mind that the auctioneer
provides information on the features of the object for sale. Other types of information could have
diﬀerent implications. For example, if the auctioneer were to reveal his valuation of the object
in a private value setting (and his valuation was independent of the bidders’ valuations) then this
information would have no eﬀect.
2information without reducing the gains of existing bidders. Hence information and
competition are complements when maximizing total surplus.
The eﬀect on expected revenue is related. Auctioneer expected revenue is total
surplus minus bidders’ informational rents. Increasing competition naturally reduces
bidder rents and thereby reduces the cost of providing information for the auctioneer.
The compounded eﬀect of competition on total surplus and informational rents is
to increase the incentives of the auctioneer to provide more information. As the
number of participants goes to inﬁnity informational rents disappear, consequently
total surplus and expected revenues converge and so do the optimal and the eﬃcient
levels of information.
Our results are demonstrated in the context of a standard private value auction.
Prior to the auction we allow the auctioneer to provide bidders with information in
the form of private signals correlated with their private valuations. The auctioneer
controls the informativeness of the signals and chooses it so as to maximize his expected
revenue from the auction. We use a general notion of informativeness which we refer to
as signal accuracy. Once the auctioneer chooses the accuracy of the signals it becomes
common knowledge, but the actual realizations of the private signals are known only by
bidders. Each bidder uses this information (the level of accuracy and the realization
of his private signal) to update his expected valuation of the object and then the
auction takes place. We study both the socially eﬃcient and the optimal (revenue
maximizing) choice of information, and conclude by analyzing what happens as the
number of bidders goes to inﬁnity.
Note that we are modeling the match between the information revealed by the auc-
tioneer and private preferences implicitly, via private signals which are correlated with
agent’s true and unknown valuations. An alternative approach is to model this match
3explicitly, i.e. have the auctioneer provide a public signal related to the characteristics
of the object. Then, agents who have private information about their preferences inter-
pret the signal and revise their expected valuations. Ganuza (2004) follows the direct
approach in a Hotelling setting where an auctioneer sells a good to bidders who are
located on a circle according to a uniform distribution. In this alternative symmetric
setting, he ﬁnds the same tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and informational rents.
Another paper that is related to ours is Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003). Their
objective is to study the design of the optimal auction and the optimal information
structure in private value settings. They do this by allowing the auctioneer to provide
information to bidders asymmetrically. We take a diﬀerent approach centered on the
case where the auctioneer is constrained to provide information symmetrically. Such
a constraint arises naturally in many real problems: in Internet and other auctions it
can be very hard to identify active bidders until they actually make a bid, which con-
siderably complicates the process of providing information in a personalized manner;
also, in government-related auctions legal restrictions often require the auctioneer to
publicly release information and explicitly forbid asymmetric information provision in
order to avoid favoritism or corruption; furthermore, in some settings the information
given to one bidder could be shared with other bidders or it could leak in some way,
undermining the desired eﬀects of information discrimination.
Moreover, the methodology of Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003) is not well suited
to the types of questions we pose here. We are interested in the interaction between
information and competition. In their work, the information the auctioneer gives to
bidders takes the form of partitions which are diﬃcult to rank in terms of informational
content or precision as the number of bidders changes. Our approach is closer to the
work of Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002), Persico (2000), and Athey and Levin (2001).
4As in those papers we work with information structures that can be ordered in terms
of their accuracy.
In private value auctions, Es˝ o and Szentes (2003) assume that the auctioneer can
fully commit to providing any given level of information precision prior to charging
bidders for it. Thus, the auctioneer can extract all the informational rents ex-ante and
the optimal amount of information released will be the eﬃcient one. We study the
case where the precision of information is known only when that information is made
public (and then it is too late for the auctioneer to try to get bidders to pay him for
it).
There are also a number of papers that focus on the incentives of bidders to acquire
information rather than those of the auctioneer to reveal it: Tan (1992) compares
sealed bid ﬁrst and second price auction formats under diﬀerent information acquisition
technologies in private value settings; Stegeman (1996) shows that in private value
auctions the sealed bid second price auction induces eﬃcient information acquisition;
Matthews (1984) and Persico (2001) study bidder information acquisition in the pure
common value auction and aﬃliated values respectively. Compte and Jehiel(2004)
compare bidder incentives to acquire information and their eﬀect on revenues in static
and dynamic auctions with private values and asymmetrically informed bidders.
A very interesting related empirical paper is that by Kavajecz and Keim (2004).
It documents how some institutional investors use auctions to buy and sell a large
number of shares as one package. It is related to this paper because in this setting
brokers’ (bidders’) valuation of the package has a substantial private value component
(it strongly depends on how the package of shares matches the demand from his other
clients and which varies substantially from broker to broker). These auctions are called
blind auctions because the auctioneer consciously provides relatively little detail on
5the shares in the package at auction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the model and describe how bidders’ valuations depend on the information the auc-
tioneer releases concerning the object. Section 3 studies the auctioneer’s information
release, characterizes the eﬃcient solution and the auctioneer’s optimal strategy. Sec-
tion 4, concludes by discussing the scope and implications of the model. All proofs
are relegated to a technical appendix.
2 The Model
An auctioneer wants to sell an object he values at zero to one of n (ex-ante) identical
risk-neutral bidders (indexed by i = 1,...,n). Bidders’ valuations of the object are
private and unknown. Bidder i’s realized valuation after the auction is described by
a random variable, Vi. We assume all agents are ex-ante identical so that for all
i = 1,...,n, Vi is independently distributed on V = [0,1] according to a common
distribution H with mean µ, where for all v ∈ [0,1], H describes the cumulative
distribution of V , H(v) = Pr(Vi ≤ v).
The utility obtained by bidder i from winning the auction is quasilinear. If the
realized valuation is vi and he makes a monetary payment of ti, the utility obtained
is given by
ui(vi,ti) = vi − ti.
All bidders start with identical priors, described by H, and no other information
on the object2. Hence, their expected valuations of the object will be the same and
2The model could start with each bidder having a private estimate of the value of the good (in
addition to the common prior). This would add a great deal of technical complexity that would
complicate the demonstration of our results. Nevertheless, as long as these estimates do not alter the
ex-ante symmetry from the point of view of the auctioneer, we do not see any reason why our results
should change in any qualitatively signiﬁcant way.
6equal to µ.
The auctioneer can reveal information on the object prior to the auction. The
production of information is costly. By paying an amount δ ∈ [0,∞) the auctioneer
will generate information in the form of private signals (Xi)n
i=1. Bidder i receives the
private signal Xi and no other. The signals are independent and identically distributed
random variables. We assume that these signals are drawn from the space of signals,
X ⊆ R, and for each i = 1,...,n, each Xi is informative only about bidder i’s own
true and unknown valuation of the object, vi.
When the auctioneer decides how much to invest in providing information, δ,
he determines the informational content of the private signals, (Xi)n
i=1. Formally,
by choosing δ, the auctioneer determines the information structure, where an in-
formation structure is a joint distribution, Fδ over signals, (Xi)n
i=1 and valuations
(Vi)n
i=1 indexed by δ. As the signals are independent, there exists a distribution
Fδ(v,x) = Pr(V ≤ v,X ≤ x), such that




We leave out the i subscripts on signals and valuations whenever they are clear from
the context. With minor abuse of notation let Fδ(x) and Fδ(v) denote the marginal
distributions of X and V respectively, and Fδ(x|v) and Fδ(v|x) the conditional dis-
tributions, where Fδ(x|v) = Pr(X ≤ x|V = v). As priors have to be consistent with
the joint distribution, Fδ(v,x), then Fδ(v) = H(v). It will be convenient to assume
that Fδ(x) is strictly increasing. From now on, we apply the following convention:
the terms ‘increasing’ and ‘greater than’ mean ‘non-decreasing’ and ‘no less than’, and
when it is important to distinguish between them we use mathematical notation which
is unambiguous.
We will not yet formalize exactly how a higher δ generates better information, we
7discuss that in the next section, section 2.1. At this stage, it suﬃces to realize that
the information structures are indexed by δ, that this δ serves to rank the information
structures, and ﬁnally, that δ, the overall level of signal accuracy, is public information
to all bidders. We will use the terms ‘more information’, ‘better information’, ‘more
precise information’ and ‘more accurate information’ interchangeably.
After the auctioneer has released the information, the awarding process takes place.
To participate in this process, each bidder combines his knowledge of δ and the real-
ization of the private signal, xi, to update his expected valuation of the object, also
referred to as the interim valuation and denoted wi(xi,δ), using Bayes’ rule. The
auctioneer sells the object using a second-price sealed-bid auction.3 For simplicity we
abstract from reserve prices and assume that the object is always sold. Summarizing,
the model is structured as follows:
1. Bidders start with common priors over their unknown valuations for the object.
2. Prior to the auction, the auctioneer, knowing the number of bidders, n, decides
how much to spend on information, δ (the more he spends the more precise will
the information be). This decision becomes public information.
3. Given δ, each bidder receives a private signal xi over his valuation.
4. According to δ and the private signals, (xi)n
i=1, bidders update their valuations
of the object.
3We have chosen the second-price sealed-bid auction for the sake of simplicity. As will be clear
in the following, at the awarding stage bidders are symmetric in expected terms, risk neutral and
their expected valuations of the object are independently distributed. Then, applying the revenue
equivalence theorem, any auction mechanism in which the object is always awarded to the buyer with
the highest valuation and where any bidder with the lowest valuation obtains zero surplus, yields
the same expected revenue to the auctioneer. Thus, all “standard” auctions (second-price sealed-bid,
ﬁrst-price sealed-bid, oral ascending (English) or oral descending (Dutch)) and many non-standard
auctions such as an “all-pay” auction would yield the same expected revenue to the auctioneer, bidders
would make the same expected payments as a function of their valuations and, as a consequence, the
same results would be obtained.
85. The second-price sealed-bid auction takes place.
We will now give more details on how a higher δ generates more informative signals
and also look at how interim valuations, wi(Xi,δ), are distributed. Then the analy-
sis will proceed in the usual way: we characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
starting from the auction and move backwards. We focus on the auctioneer’s decision
about how much information to provide to the bidders. First, we characterize the ef-
ﬁcient solution of this problem and then the auctioneer’s optimal information release.
Finally, we compare both solutions.
2.1 Information Structures
The auctioneer chooses how much to spend on information, δ, and determines the
information structure faced by bidders, Fδ, which bidders use to evaluate the informa-
tional content of the signals they receive, Xi. We assume that for each δ, Fδ(x) has
support on a subinterval of X and is strictly increasing on that subinterval.
Given any δ > 0, the signals will be informative in the sense that given two signals
x0 and x, such that x > x0, receiving the larger signal, x, is good news in the sense
of Milgrom (1981); i.e. the posterior distribution of true valuations conditional on
x, Fδ(v|x), dominates the posterior distribution of true valuations conditional on x0,
Fδ(v|x0), in terms of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) denoted Fδ(·|x) ≥st
Fδ(·|x0), (that is Fδ(v|x) ≤ Fδ(v|x0) for all v ∈ [0,1]). This implies that for any
increasing function of the realized valuation, ψ(v), E[ψ(v)|x] ≥ E[ψ(v)|x0].
We want to formalize how a higher δ leads to better information. For this we will
transform the realized signal Xi into a new random variable Πi which has exactly
the same informational content as Xi. This new Πi is obtained using the probability
integral transformation: Πi = Fδ(Xi) so that F
−1
δ (Πi) = Xi, where F
−1
δ is the right-
continuous inverse of the marginal distribution Fδ(x). We use Πi instead of Xi because
9it is informationally equivalent and yet has a marginal distribution with a very useful
property: the marginal distribution of Πi is the uniform on [0,1] and hence independent
of δ.
We can now deﬁne exactly how a higher δ leads to higher informational content
of the signal Xi. Let δ > δ
0 and deﬁne Π = Fδ(X) = Fδ0(X). Then Fδ is more
informative than Fδ0 in the following sense:
Deﬁnition 1 Let Fδ and Fδ0 be two information structures with δ > δ
0 and associated
posterior distribution functions Fδ(v|x) and, Fδ0(v|x). The information structure Fδ



























Thus, a higher δ leads to conditional distributions over true valuations that are
more sensitive to signal realizations.
This intuitive notion of accuracy is related to notions of informativeness proposed
in the previous literature. In particular, it can be shown that our notion of accuracy
is equivalent to the notion of stochastic supermodularity4. In order to put our notion
in context we refer the interested reader to Athey and Levin (2001) where several
diﬀerent notions of informativeness of information structures are discussed.
2.2 Endogenous Bidder Valuations
In this section we want to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent information structures on
the distribution of interim bidder valuations. Recall bidders start with only a prior
over their valuation of the object, H. Then, the auctioneer spends δ and each bidder
receives a private signal xi. For ﬁxed δ and signal xi, the updated distribution of
4See remark 1 in the appendix and Topkis (1998) for additional details over stochastic supermod-
ularity.
10valuations for bidder i is Fδ(v|xi), so that their expected valuations change from µ






We have seen that for given δ, a higher signal implies better news and hence for all
δ > 0, w(x,δ) is an increasing function of the realization of the signal, x.
How about if we change δ? Recall we are using the transformed signal Π = Fδ(X)
to make signals comparable across information structures. We will need the interim
valuation (the updated expected valuation) of a bidder who receives the transformed
signal Π: let W(π,δ) = w(F
−1
δ (π),δ). Notice that, as we have assumed that Fδ is
strictly increasing, then F
−1
δ (·) is also strictly increasing, π is a monotone increasing
transformation of x and for all δ, W(π,δ) is increasing in π.
Then, a more accurate signal implies greater diﬀerences between expected valua-
tions:
Lemma 1 Let Fδ and Fδ0 be two information structures such that δ > δ
0 (Fδ is more






i.e. W(π,δ) − W(π0,δ) is increasing in δ.
We provide a direct proof of this in the Appendix. Also, this result follows directly
from the equivalence between our notion of accuracy and stochastic supermodularity
we have mentioned above.
Before we conclude this section we want to be very speciﬁc about what Lemma
1 means in terms of the distribution of interim valuations. Lemma 1 basically states
that, a higher δ implies a more ‘spread out’ distribution of interim valuations. In the
11statistics literature there are several ways to formalize the notion of what it means for
a distribution to be ‘spread out’.
One notion is the following: a random variable X with cumulative distribution
function F is said to be more disperse than another random variable Y with cumulative






Using this deﬁnition, we can read Lemma 1 as follows, if Fδ is more accurate than Fδ0
then the distribution of interim valuations generated by Fδ is more disperse than the
distribution of interim valuations generated by Fδ0.
Economists are more familiar with a diﬀerent and yet related notion of ‘spread
out’ distributions: a random variable X with cumulative distribution function F,
ﬁnite mean and support on A ⊆ R is dominated in terms of second order stochastic
dominance (SOSD) by a random variable Y with cumulative distribution function G,
ﬁnite mean and support on B ⊆ R, denoted X ≤SSD Y , if the expected value of X is







In our setup, we can order the distribution of interim expected valuations according
to second order stochastic dominance:
Corollary 1 Let Fδ and Fδ0 be two information structures such that δ > δ
0 (Fδ is more
accurate than Fδ0), then W(Π,δ) is dominated by W(Π0,δ
0) in the sense of SOSD
Summarizing, the auctioneer can control how spread out is the distribution of
expected valuations, in the sense that the diﬀerence between the expected valuation
of a bidder with a signal in the q-th percentile and a bidder with a signal in the p-th
12percentile is greater if the signals come from a more accurate information system. But
why should more information lead to a more spread out distribution of valuations?
Intuitively, as bidders react asymmetrically to information, some increasing and some
reducing their expected valuations, more information is more likely to lead to greater
diﬀerences in updated bidders’ valuations.
More formally, if the signals are more accurate, bidders give more weight to the
realization of the signal in the calculation of their updated expected valuations. The
increased importance of the realization of the signal comes with a reduction in the
importance of the (common) prior. Thus the updated expected valuation is more sen-
sitive to diﬀerences in realizations of the signals and the eﬀect of receiving one signal
rather than another implies a bigger eﬀect, a bigger diﬀerence, in the interim expected
valuations. Then, more information naturally leads to a distribution of expected val-
uations that is more ‘spread out’.
3 Information Release
In this section, we study the accuracy of information the auctioneer provides. We want
to contrast the optimal and the eﬃcient level of accuracy and we start by characterizing
the eﬃcient level of accuracy: how much accuracy should the auctioneer provide?
3.1 The Eﬃcient Level of Accuracy
The eﬃcient level of accuracy is that which maximizes the total surplus at the time
of the information release. In our setup, total surplus is deﬁned as the sum of the
auctioneer’s revenue and the interim utility of the bidder with the highest expected
valuation at the time of the auction.
Recall that the awarding mechanism is a second price auction. Given that for every
information structure expected valuations are increasing in the signal, the highest
13bid will come from the bidder with the highest expected valuation and this bidder
will be the one with the highest realization of the signal. We denote the highest
realization of the signal by x1. In terms of the transformed signal, Π, the winner will
be the one who receives π1 ≡ Fδ(x1). If we take expectations prior to the information
release, then the expected valuation of the winning bidder will depend on n and δ:
V1(n,δ) = E[W(Π1,δ)]. The notation makes explicit the number of bidders as we
shall be studying the eﬀect of changing n. Let U1:n(p) be the cumulative distribution
function of the ﬁrst order statistic of n independent uniform random variables on [0,1].





The next result characterizes the relationship between the expected valuation of
the winning bidder and the amount of information provided by the auctioneer.
Proposition 1 The expected valuation of the winning bidder V1(n,δ) is increasing in
the accuracy of the information, δ.
Proposition 1 rests on the fact that the winning bidder will be the bidder with the
highest realization of the signal. The expected highest realization is greater than the
mean, which is also the prior expectation. As more accurate signals lead to putting
greater weight of the realization of the signal relative to the prior, then the greater
the accuracy the greater the expected valuation of the winner, V1(n,δ). As we said
in the introduction, our model could be interpreted as a situation in which the auc-
tioneer provides information about the features of the object and bidders have private
information over their preferences. Under this interpretation Proposition 1 can be in-
terpreted as: the larger the information provided to bidders, the better the matching
between the features of the object and the preferences of the winning bidder.
14Thus, the trade-oﬀ faced when deciding the eﬃcient amount to spend on infor-
mation, δ
E, is between increasing the expected valuation of the winning bidder and




V1(n,δ) − δ (1)
The next proposition states the relationship between the eﬃcient level of accuracy
and the level of competition.
Proposition 2 The total surplus is supermodular on δ and n.
Proposition 2 states that the diﬀerence in terms of expected surplus between two
levels of signal accuracy is larger the larger the number of bidders. Mechanically, more
bidders imply that the highest realization of the signal will be higher. Thus, more
competition increases the return from giving more weight to the highest realization
of the signal and hence the incentive to increase signal accuracy. From an economic
point of view, the larger the number of bidders, the larger the value of information.
The intuition is that the larger the pool of bidder preferences, the larger the incentives
to improve the matching by increasing the accuracy of information on the object.
Corollary 2 The eﬃcient amount of information, δ
E, is increasing in the number of
bidders, n ≥ 1.
As the number of bidders in the auction increases the marginal eﬀect of adding
information is greater so that with more bidders it is eﬃcient to spend more on infor-
mation.
3.2 The Auctioneer’s Optimal Information Release
Having characterized the eﬃcient amount of information, let us now turn to the auc-
tioneer’s problem: how much information to release if one wants to maximize expected
revenue from the auction.
15We ﬁrst characterize the bidder’s optimal strategy given a ﬁxed amount of expen-
diture on information, δ, and the realization of his private signal xi. The nature of
the second-price auction ensures that it is optimal for the bidder to bid his expected
valuation: let bi(xi,δ) be the bid made by agent i on knowing δ and receiving signal xi,
then bi(xi,δ) = w(xi,δ) = W(F
−1
δ (xi),δ). The winner of the auction will be the one
with the highest signal, x1. As bidders bid their valuations and we are in a second-price
auction, the payment to the auctioneer will be equal to the expected valuation of the
bidder with the second-highest signal, x2. Using the transformed variables, the highest
signal is π1. Denote the second highest signal as π2 ≡ F
−1
δ (x2). As the transformed
signals are independent and uniformly distributed on [0,1], U2:n(p), the cumulative
distribution of the second order statistic in a sample of n iid uniform random variables





Where V2(n,δ) is the expected price in the auction and the expected valuation of
the bidder with the second highest signal realization. The next proposition states the
relationship between expected price and the amount of information.
Proposition 3 The expected price (the valuation of the second highest bidder), V2(n,δ),
is increasing in the amount of information, δ, if the number of bidders is larger than
3. The value of information to the auctioneer is in fact negative for n = 2.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is the same as behind Proposition 1 replacing
the bidder with the highest realization of the signal with the one with the second
highest realization. But, if there are only two bidders then in expected terms, the
signal of the loser in the auction (and hence his expected valuation and the price) will
16be below the prior. Thus, improving information has a negative value as it lowers the
expected price (and revenue).
The next proposition addresses the question of how the rents generated by higher
information are distributed between the auctioneer and the winner in the auction.
The expected informational rents of the winning bidder is the diﬀerence between his
valuation and the valuation of the second closest bidder (which is the price paid for
the object)
Rw(n,δ) = V1(n,δ) − V2(n,δ)
Proposition 4 The expected informational rents of the winning bidder are increasing
in δ.
Proposition 4 is linked with the fact that more information implies a more ‘spread
out’ distribution of interim valuations. Hence Proposition 4 shows us the drawback of
providing information to the market: it increases bidders’ rents.
To establish the auctioneer’s optimal strategy, we have to characterize the level
of information, δ
A, that maximizes the diﬀerence between the expected price and the




V2(n,δ) − δ (2)
By comparing (1) and (2) it is easy to see that the structure of the auctioneer’s problem
is identical to that of total surplus maximization with V1(n,δ) substituted by V2(n,δ),
so that the intuition behind the results presented in the following Proposition and its
Corollary is the same as those for Proposition 2 and Corollary 2.
Proposition 5 The auctioneer’s expected proﬁts are supermodular on δ and n.
Hence the larger the number of bidders, the larger the incentives of the auctioneer
to provide information.
17Corollary 3 The optimal amount of information, δ
A, is increasing in the number of
bidders, n.
Finally, the following proposition presents the main result of the paper.
Proposition 6 The auctioneer provides less information to bidders than would be
eﬃcient, δ
A ≤ δ
E. The diﬀerence between the eﬃcient information release and the
equilibrium information release converges to 0 as the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity.




V1(n,δ) − δ − Rw(n,δ)
This formulation clariﬁes the trade-oﬀ faced by the auctioneer when providing
information to the market. On the one hand, when the auctioneer provides more
information, the eﬃciency of the auction process goes up (V1(n,δ) is increasing in δ –
Lemma 1). On the other hand, the increase in information also raises the informational
rents of the winning bidder (Rw(δ) is increasing in δ – Proposition 4). The optimal
balance of these two opposing eﬀects leads the auctioneer to provide less information
than would be eﬃcient. In other words, the auctioneer will restrict the information
released to the market in order to make the potential bidders more homogeneous, with
the underlying goal of intensifying competition and increasing his expected revenue. As
the number of bidders increases, the informational rents are reduced and the trade-oﬀ
is weakened. In the limit, as the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity, the informational
rents disappear and with it the diﬀerence between eﬃcient and optimal information
release.
184 Conclusions
We were interested in what happens when the auctioneer can release information to
bidders and how the amount of information released relates to the level of competi-
tion in private value auctions. We have set up a standard auction model and used
a general notion of informativeness to study this question. We have shown that the
optimal level of information released by the auctioneer is not the same as the eﬃ-
cient level, which contrasts with the “linkage principle”. This is because in private
value settings, there are two factors that determine the optimal provision of informa-
tion: (i) improved information increases the eﬃciency of the auction; (ii) improved
information also increases the informational rents of the winning bidder. These two
eﬀects represent opposing forces for the auctioneer: improved eﬃciency raises revenues
while increased informational rents reduce revenues. Hence, the optimal amount of
information released is below the eﬃcient one.
Our second main result relates competition and the information provided to the
market. We show that there is a complementarity between competition and informa-
tion when maximizing total welfare and also, when maximizing auctioneer revenues.
Then, both the eﬃcient and the optimal level increase with the number of bidders.
We conclude by showing that as the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity, the diﬀerence
between the eﬃcient and optimal solutions vanishes.
The complementary between information and competition opens up a number of
interesting avenues for future research. For example, this could be an ingredient in
explaining the prevalence of incomplete contracting in many real life situations. In
procurement, one can consider the possibility of reducing the degree of speciﬁcity
in a contract in order to homogenize the market and inject an additional degree of
competition into the procurement process.
19Another possible extension is to consider endogenizing the degree of competition
in the auction by adding an initial stage whereby ﬁrms decide whether to enter into
the auction or not. The complementarity between the level of information provision
and competition should intuitively lead to multiplicity of equilibria in the entry game.
There will be equilibria with low competition and a low level of information and others
with lots of competition and a high level of information.
20A Appendix
A.1 Preliminary Result and Notation
Using the notation developed in the text, we will make repeated use of the following
very well-known result, which we state as a lemma: if X ≥st Y then for all increasing
functions ψ, E[ψ(X)] ≥ E[ψ(Y )].
Lemma 2 Let X and Y be real-valued random variables with cumulative distribution
functions F and G respectively, such that F(z) ≤ G(z) for all z ∈ R. For all bounded







We also use the following notation: Ui:j(x) is the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of a random variable Y such that Ui:j(x) = Pr(Y ≤ x). This random variable
is the ith order statistic from a sample of j independently and identically uniform
distributed random variables over [0,1], where U1:j refers to the cdf of the maximum
of the sample, U2:j to the cdf of the second highest realization in the sample and so
on until Uj:j which is the cdf of the minimum realization in the sample. We will also
make use of the functional form of U1:n which is, for π ∈ [0,1], U1:n(π) = πn.
A.2 Proofs





















































As I(δ) is more accurate than I(δ




























Integrating over v on both sides of condition (5) and combining the outcome with






Corollary 4 W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0) is increasing in π for δ > δ
0.











Proof of Corollary 1: Applying the law of iterated expectations: µ = E[E[v|X]] =
E[W(Π,δ)] and µ = E[E[v|X0]] = E[W(Π0,δ
0)]. If X and Y , two random variables,
have the same mean and X is more disperse than Y , i.e. X ≥disp Y , then X ≤SSD Y
(Shaked and Shantikumar(1994), Theorem 2.B.10).
22Proof of Proposition 1: We want to show that if δ > δ0 then V1(n,δ) ≥ V1(n,δ
0).




0)) dU1:n(p) ≥ 0
By the law of iterated expectations, the expected valuation of the distribution of
expected valuations, E[W(π,δ)], must not depend on the information structure. Let










By Corollary 4, the function ψ(π) ≡ (W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0)) is increasing in π. As
U1:n(p) = pn ≤ U1:1(p) for all n ≥ 1 and p ∈ [0,1] and ψ(π) is increasing, we can apply
Lemma 2 and the result follows.




This is equivalent to showing
V1(n + 1,δ) − V1(n + 1,δ











From Corollary 4, the function ψ(π) ≡ (W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0)) is increasing in π. As
U1:n+1(p) = pn+1 ≤ U1:n(p) = pn for all p ∈ [0,1], we can apply Lemma 2.
Proof of Corollary 2: Immediate from the results of Milgrom and Shanon (1994)
and Proposition 2.
23Proof of Proposition 3: This follows by the same logic as the proof of Proposition
1 and the well-known result that U2:n(p) ≤ U1:1(p) for all p ∈ [0,1] and n ≥ 3.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We want to show that for δ > δ
0, Rw(n,δ) ≥ Rw(n,δ
0), i.e.
V1(n,δ) − V2(n,δ) ≥ V1(n,δ
0) − V2(n,δ
0)
This is equivalent to
V1(n,δ) − V1(n,δ











Again, using Corollary 4 and the stochastic dominace of the ﬁrst order statistic
over the second, U1:n(p) ≤ U2:n(p) for all p ∈ [0,1]. Applying Lemma 2 concludes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 5: This follows by the same logic as the proof of Proposi-
tion 2 and the property that increasing the sample by one increases the second order
statistic (in the stochastic sense), i.e. U2:n+1(p) ≤ U2:n(p) for all p ∈ [0,1].
Proof of Corollary 3: Immediate from the results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994)
and Proposition 5.









{V1(n,δ) − δ − Rw(n,δ)}
where Rw(δ) is as deﬁned in the text.
Compare the formulation of the auctioneer’s problem to the formulation of the
social welfare maximization problem (equation 1 ). As δ









Rw(δ) is increasing (Proposition 4) so that if δ
A > δ




A] ≥ E[W(Π1, δ
E) − δ
E]
but this contradicts the fact that δ
E maximizes social surplus, so that δ
A ≤ δ
E.
To establish the second part of the Proposition, consider the informational rents,
Rw(n,δ).












We know U1:n(π) = πn and U2:n(π) = nπn−1 − (n − 1)πn.




n→∞U1:n(π) − U2:n(π) = 0
As W(π,δ) is bounded and monotone in π, and (U1:n(π) − U2:n(π)) converges to zero









25Hence, the objective function of the auctioneer approaches total surplus as n goes to
inﬁnity.
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